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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, \ 
Plaintiff-Respondent, I 
v. \ Case No. 13879 
PATEY CURTIS, \ 
Defendant-Appellant. J 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was a criminal action brought by the State of Utah 
against Patry Curtis, Defendant-Appellant, charging him with the 
crime of distribution of a controlled substance in violation of Section 
58-37-8 (1) (A) (a) (ii), Utah Code Ann., 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for 
the County of Utah, State of Utah, on the 16th day of October, 1974, 
in a non-jury trial, the Defendant was found guilty of distribution 
of a controlled substance for value. On , Defend-
ant was sentenced to imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for 
( ) years. 
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Prior to trial, on the 11th day of October, 1974, in the District 
Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Utah, 
State of Utah, Judge Ballif heard the testimony of Eose Ann Stout 
on the issue of entrapment. On the 15th day of October, 1974, in the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County 
of Utah, State of Utah, Judge Bryant Croft, as trial judge, ruled 
that the testimony of Eose Ann Stout given before Judge Ballif 
should be stricken from the record as inadmissible and evidence taken 
anew on the issue of entrapment. Judge Croft, after hearing the evi-
dence on entrapment, ruled as a matter of law that no entrapment 
occurred. 
BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an Order of this Court reversing the verdict and 
judgment rendered at the trial of this cause and ruling as a matter 
of law that entrapment occurred or in the alternative remanding the 
case to the Fourth District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, for a 
new trial consistent with the ruling of this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Beginning sometime in March, 1974, Eose Ann Stout, working as 
an undercover agent of the Eegion Four Task Force, State of Utah, 
made the acquaintance of Defendant Pat ry Curtis for the purpose 
of purchasing narcotics., (Hearing Transcript 33, Trial Transcript 
5-6). Despite an initial conversation concerning drugs, Eose Ann 
Stout testified that her first " b u y " of drugs from Defendant did 
not occur until April 8, 1974. (H. 33). Defendant, against his own 
interest, testified that during March and April of 1974 he was con-
tinuously procuring drugs for Stout for her personal use. (T. 66), 
The Task Force had no record of these additional transactions. 
2 
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The transaction in question occurred on June 18, 1974 in Provo, 
Utah. Stout with money supplied and recorded by the Region Four 
Task Force paid Defendant for drugs, specifically amphetamines, 
which Defendant had purchased for Stout from a third party. (T. 6-15, 
64-65). The transaction was monitored but not fully observed by the 
members of the Task Force. (T. 29-30). Defendant was immediately 
arrested, the marked money was found on his person. (T. 30). Stout 
one hour later turned in the amphetamines to the Task Force (T. 34). 
Defendant does not deny supplying Stout with amphetamines on 
June 18, 1974 and on prior occasions. However, Defendant testified 
that he never did so voluntarily but only at the repeated urgings 
of Stout and never at any profit to himself. (T. 56). While Stout 
denied any sexual relations between herself and Defendant (H. 37), 
Defendant and a defense witness testified that such a relationship 
did exist in March and April of 1974. (T. 50, H. 78). Despite the 
sexual relationship between Stout and Defendant terminating prior 
to the transaction in question, Defendant testified that it had influ-
enced him greatly and that he would not have procured drugs for 
Stout at any time but for their previous sexual relationship (T. 61-62). 
Throughout the entrapment hearing, the testimony of which was 
incorporated into the trial (T. 43), and the trial itself, defense coun-
sel attempted to introduce evidence of Stout's motives for joining 
the Task Force and testifying against Curtis. Additionally, defense 
counsel sought, for purposes of motive and credibility, the admission 
of evidence showing the pattern and practice of Stout as an under-
cover agent in not turning in drugs, in using drugs herself, and in 
starting others on drugs. The court either disallowed or limited this 
line of questioning. (H. 6-28, T. 48-49, 88-90). 
3 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LIMITING THE LINE 
OF QUESTIONING ON THE MOTIVES, CREDIBILITY, 
AND PATTERN AND PRACTICE OF ROSE ANN STOUT 
IN HER CAPACITY OF AN UNDERCOVER AGENT. 
Throughout the entrapment hearing and trial itself, defense coun-
sel in his examination of Rose Ann Stout (H. 6-28, 41-49), and the 
various defense witnesses (H. 53, 59, 78, T. 48-49, 88-90) attempted 
to establish the motives for Stout in joining the Task Force and in 
testifying, her pattern and practice in working as an undercover 
agent in regards to using drugs herself, in turning drugs procured 
into the Task Force, and in starting others on drugs. The trial court, 
despite Judge Ballif's ruling in the prior evidentiary hearing held 
on October 11, 1974 that such evidence was admissible, either ex-
cluded the testimony entirely or severely limited the scope of the 
questioning. In not permitting the defense to demonstrate the il-
legal personal involvement of Stout in narcotics which was made 
easier by her privileged position on the Task Force, the trial court 
unduly restricted the examination into her motives and credibility. 
Under Sections 78-24-1, 78-24-9, and 78-24-11, Utah Code Ann., 
1953, the character and motives of a witness may be admissible as 
to the witness' credibility with certain exceptions. Section 78-24-1, 
supra, only allows the character of the witness for truth, honesty, 
or integrity to be drawn into question. Sections 78-24-9 and 78-24-11, 
supra, protect against improper, insulting, or degrading questions 
to a witness with the caveat in Section 78-24-9 that a degrading ques-
tion must be answered when it pertains to a fact in issue. 
The statutes, as do Rules 20, 21, and 22 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, conform with the general proposition that the interest and 
4 
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bias of a witness can always be shown. 25 ALE 3d 537; State v. 
Ceras, 60 IT. 208, 207 P.507 (1922). Similarly, motives of a witness 
are never considered immaterial and thus wide latitude should gen-
erally be given in the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses in. 
criminal trials. 62 ALE 2d 610. At least one Utah case has stated 
that where a conflict in testimony of opposing witnesses exist, their 
reputation for truth and veracity becomes a relevant issue under 
Section 78-24-1, supra. LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Ut. 
2d 260,420 P.2d 615 (1966). 
This court in State t\ Hogensen, 91 U. 351, 64 P.2d 229 (1936) 
addressed the issue of whether prior specific conduct could be elicited 
to affect the credibility, as opposed to the motives, of a witness. 
After an extensive discussion of the circumstances when such testi-
mony would be admissible, " . . . if it is pertinent to establish the 
ultimate fact in issue or to a fact from which such a fact may be 
presumed or inferred. . . ," the court concluded that it was not per-
missible in a homicide trial to allow the defense to show the morally 
bad character of an eye-witness simply for reliability purposes. In 
the case at bar, defense counsel was attempting to show specific in-
stances where Stout received drugs but did not turn them in or 
started others on drugs to attack her credibility as an honest and 
truthful witness in a narcotics case. 
Shortly after the decision in State v. Hogenson, supra, this court 
again defined the permissible scope of questions to a witness but in 
light of the statutory prohibition against degrading questions. In 
In re Sadlier, 97 Ut. 291, 85 P.2d 810 (1938), a juvenile witness had 
been held in contempt for refusing to answer a question on her sexual 
relations with defendant in a carnal knowledge case on the grounds 
it was incriminating and degrading. I t was held that since the state 
was only charging one specific instance of carnal knowledge between 
5 
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the defendant and the juvenile witness, any prior sexual relations 
between them would not be relevant. Also, the court noted that it 
was the state asking the question on direct of its own witness and 
stated that such a question might be proper on cross-examination. 
The case law and statutes on the permissible scope of the ques-
tioning of witnesses as to credibility and motives provide only gen-
eral guidelines, however, it is clear that greater latitude is allowed 
in questioning an adverse witness. Here, defense counsel was not 
attempting to degrade Stout or embarrass her. Rather, the entire 
line of questioning on her involvement in narcotics was for the pur-
pose of attacking her credibility and demonstrating her motives in 
testifying. Her illegal involvement with drugs went to the fact in 
issue, whether Defendant Curtis was guilty of selling drugs or whether 
Stout entrapped him into committing the offense. 
POINT I I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT T H E DEFENDANT WAS 
ENTRAPPED INTO COMMITTING THE OFFENSE 
CHARGED. 
Consistently, from Sorrells v. U.S., 287 U.S. 435 (1932) to the 
more recent U.S. v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), the United States 
Supreme Court has sanctioned as a tool of crime detection trickery 
and persuasion by government agents but only when used against 
persons predisposed to commit the crime in question. As stated by 
the Court in Sorrells v. U.S., supra., 
I t is well settled that decoys may be used to entrap crim-
inals, and to present opportunity to one intending or willing 
to commit crime. But decoys are not permissible to ensnare 
the innocent and law-abiding into the commission of crime. 
When the criminal design originates, not with the accused, 
6 
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but is conceived in the mind of the government officers, and 
the accused is by persuasion, deceitful representation, or in-
ducement lured into the commission of a criminal act, the gov-
ernment is estopped by sound public policy from prosecution 
therefore. 287 U.S. 435, 445. 
The emphasis on the predisposition of the accused was continued 
in Sherman v. U.S., 356 U.S. 369 (1958) where the Court found that 
the defendant, a drug addict, had been entrapped into selling drugs 
to an agent when the evidence showed that the defendant was not 
normally a dealer, made no profit from the transaction, and com-
mitted the offense only after the repeated urgings of the agent. The 
so-called "subjective test" of Sorrells v. U.S., supra, and Sherman 
v. U.S., supra, was affirmed in U.S. v. Russell, supra. The defendant 
was charged with the manufacturing and sale of a controlled sub-
stance. An undercover agent had supplied the defendant with a chem-
ical essential to the manufacturing of the particular drug. The Court 
held that the defendant was not entrapped since he had been en-
gaged in the illegal activity prior to any involvement by the govern-
ment agent and so was obviously predisposed to commit the offense. 
'Similarly, Utah case law prior to the recent enacted statute, Sec-
tion 76-2-303, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as supplemented 1973, appears 
to have adopted the subjective approach, focusing on the predisposi-
tion of the accused, rather than the objective approach, looking solely 
at the conduct of the police. Typical of pre-1973 Utah law is State 
v. Schultz, 27 Ut. 2d 391, 496 P.2d 893 (1972), reh. 28 Ut. 2d 240, 
501 P.2d 106, which involved a defendant who acted as a go-between 
in a narcotics sale to an undercover officer. Despite the officer initi-
ating the transaction, this court found that no entrapment occurred. 
The defendant by his own admission of generally procuring narcotics 
for friends "as a favor" and testimony as to a prior sale made by 
the defendant was shown to be predisposed to commit the crime 
7 
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charged. The case was remanded after rehearing for the addition 
of a jury instruction on the defendant acting as an agent of the offi-
cer in procuring the drugs. 
While Section 76-2-303, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as supplemented 
1973, has changed some of the procedural aspects of asserting the 
defense of entrapment, the statute appears to have retained on the 
main a subjective approach. Subsection (1) of Section 76-2-303 reads, 
. . . Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer in-
duces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evi-
dence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating 
a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one 
not otherwise ready to commit it. . . . 
The statute still focuses on predisposition to determine if the ac-
cused is "one not otherwise ready to commit" the offense and then 
as a second prong looks to the inducement used, the conduct of the 
police. 
In reaching a conclusion on predisposition, Subsection (6) of 
Section 76-2-303, supra, changes Utah case law which viewed prior sim-
ilar crimes committed by the defendant as admissible to show his pre-
disposition to commit the crime charged. State v. Perkins, 19 Ut. 2d 
421, 432 P.2d 50 (1967). The instant statute prohibits the admission 
of past offenses of the defendant except for past felonies where 
the defendant testifies. So generally, the State will be limited to the 
conduct and words of the defendant at the time of the crime charged 
to show predisposition. However, where, as Defendant Curtis did 
in the case at bar, the accused testifies prior felonies may be ad-
mitted. Additionally, the statute does not modify prior Utah law 
which allows the State to cross examine the defendant as to his 
character and reputation for participating in the activity charged 
where the defendant has attempted on direct to show his good char-
8 
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acter and reputation. State v. Adams, 26 Ut. 2d 377, 489 P.2d 1191 
(1971); State v. Younglove, 17 Ut. 2d 268, 409 P.2d 125 (1965); State 
v. Hansen, 22 Ut. 2d 63, 448 P.2d 720 (1968). 
From the testimony at the entrapment hearing and later at trial, 
the State failed to show that Defendant was normally actually in-
volved in illegal drug traffic nor had a reputation as being involved 
in such activity. This lack of predisposition was despite Defendant 
taking the stand, thus opening himself to extensive cross-examination. 
There was no evidence of any reputation for dealing with drugs on 
the part of Defendant even though the State could have gone into 
this as rebuttal evidence. 
In looking at the second prong of the test for entrapment, the 
inducement used or conduct of the police, Defendant testified that 
but for the initial sexual relationship between himself and Stout, he 
would not have procurred drugs for her at any time. Such an as-
sertion is consistent with the lack of evidence to show that he was 
predisposed to sell narcotics. The inducement used by Stout was 
not that used in an ordinary buyer-seller relationship, U.S. v. Williams, 
488 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974) even if Stout's denial of an actual sexual 
relationship is believed. Once such excessive inducement was used, 
its effects as between this Defendant and this agent were set even 
if the actual physical relationship had terminated shortly before the 
transaction in question. 
POINT I I I 
WHEN THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT IS 
MERELY ACTING AS A GO-BETWEEN IN PROCURING 
DRUGS FOR AN UNDERCOVER AGENT AND NO EVI-
DENCE THAT DEFENDANT WAS PERSONALLY RE-
CEIVING ANY GAIN FROM THE TRANSACTION, THE 
DEFENDANT CANNOT BE FOUND GUILTY OF DIS-
TRIBUTING A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOR 
VALUE. 
9 
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Under most statutes prohibiting the sale of narcotics, including 
the instant statute Section 58-37-8, Utah Code Ann. 1953, a crucial 
factor is that the illegal distribution be for value. Thus, if no profit 
or gain resulted from the transaction, the accused could not be con-
victed under the distribution for value statute but could be convicted 
under say an illegal possession statute. The recognition that com-
mercial sellers of illegal drugs should be punished differently and 
more severely than persons who might share, give-away, or purchase 
drugs for another at no personal gain gave rise to the procuring 
agent rule or defense. Simply stated, the rule is 
. . . one who has acted without interest in the selling cannot 
be convicted as a seller even though his conduct may in fact 
have facilitated an illegal sale. U.S. v. Moses, 220 F.2d 166, 
169 (3rd Cir. 1955). 
The rule has especially been applied in cases where the accused made 
the purchase for an undercover agent-buyer and received no profit 
thereby. Durham v. State, 162 Cr. 25, 280 S.W.2d 737 (Texas Cr. 
1955); Smith v. State, 396 S.W.2d 876 (Texas Cr. 1965); Roy v. State, 
87 Nev. 517, 489 P.2d 1158 (Nev. 1971), stating the rule as being 
"fundamental." 
As noted in Posey v. State, 507 P.2d 576 (Okla. Cr. 1973), the 
procuring agent rule has been widely recognized in the federal courts 
and accepted in many state courts. In Posey v. State, supra, the 
Oklahoma court held that where the "go-between" defendant had 
no financial interest in the sale, nor pre-arranged plan or conspiracy 
with the supplier, it would be mere speculation to convict the defend-
ant of selling narcotics. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court in Adams 
v. U.S., 220 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1955) concluded that, despite the 
buyer-informant testifying that the defendant told him the more buys 
the defendant brought to the supplier, the greater the percentage 
10 
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for the defendant, all the evidence was consistent with the defend-
ant's assertion that she was only acting as a purchasing agent. The 
court held that without any evidence that the accused received a 
profit or was associated with the supplier, a sales conviction would 
be based on mere speculation. In People v. Fortes, 24 AD 2d 408, 
260 NYS 2d 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965), the procuring agent rule was 
followed despite the accused receiving a $5.00 gratuity from the buyer. 
Utah adopted the procuring agent rule in State v. Shultz, 27 Ut. 
2d 391, 496 P.2d 893 (1972), reh. 28 Ut, 2d 240, 501 P.2d 106. Two 
police agents asked the defendant to locate a drug dealer so that 
they could make a purchase. With money from the agents, defendant 
purchased the drugs from an unidentified dealer. Defendant was 
convicted of selling narcotics. Despite one of the police agents testi-
fying that defendant had made a prior drug sale to him and the de-
fendant admitting that he sometimes would help addicts procure drugs 
"as a favor," this Court held that the defendant was entitled to an 
instruction that if defendant acted solely for the benefit of the buyer 
and at the latter's direction, defendant would not be guilty of selling 
narcotics. 
Defendant testified at trial, both on direct and cross examina-
tion, that he never received any profit from any drug transactions 
with Stout but was merely acting as a conduit for her. (T. 55-56). 
While there is some conflict in the testimony, it appears that at least 
once, on April 24, 1974, the actual supplier was present during the 
transaction with Stout and Defendant. (T. 58-60). This transaction 
was monitored and taped by the Task Force. (T. 81-84). In the 
tape, Defendant clearly states that he is merely acting as a go-between 
at no personal profit. Additionally, even though Defendant took the 
stand and opened himself to extensive cross examination by the State, 
there was no evidence introduced to show that defendant was not 
11 
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acting as the claimed "go-between." Under such a fact situation, 
the procuring agent rule should apply precluding a conviction under 
the distribution for value statute. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court unduly limited the scope of the defense question-
ing of Rose Ann Stout as to her motives and credibility in testifying 
against Defendant. Evidence of Stout's illegal involvement in nar-
cotics during the time she served as an undercover agent was also 
improperly restricted as it directly related to her reliability as a 
witness in a narcotics sale where entrapment was an issue. The con-
viction should therefore be reversed and the case remanded for a 
new trial. 
In light of the evidence which was introduced during the entrap-
ment hearing and at trial, the trial court erred in not ruling as a 
matter of law that entrapment occurred. Additionally, under the 
procuring agent rule, the trial court should have directed a verdict 
of acquittal. On both these grounds, the conviction should be reversed 
and the case dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert Van Sciver 
i 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant. I 
I 
I 
I 
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